In breve, il risultato fu la costruzione di innumerevoli cattedrali nel deserto, un'inutile innalzare sproporzionate strutture che non favorì alcuna ripresa, ma lascio il paese con uno dei debiti pubblici più sbilanciati al mondo.
nel caso presente inoltre, lo stimulus package è composto anche da una enorme iniezione di liquidità "per salvare il sistema bancario": gli 800 miliardi di dollari già stanziati dal piano Paulson (circa Ottobre 2008) sono finiti. Si dice in questi casi che ogni ulteriore rifinanziamento, per quanto ingente, sia come "versare acqua in un lavandino": tutto sarà inghiottito, se le premesse che hanno causato il problema restano, come sono, invariate.
Ma quanto gli Usa possono andare avanti così, ripianando ogni 3-4 mesi i buchi che il sistema continua a riformare, mentre la loro economia reale nel frattempo è in brusca frenata (con il conseguente calo di gettito fiscale)? Quante risorse restano per nuovi investimenti in infrastrutture e "ricerca verde"?
Per di più, pur concedendo doti soprannaturali ad Obama, che in fondo è simpatico, sappiamo bene che un'assemblea di politici chiamata a spendere denaro pubblico tende a identificare il bene comune con il proprio, o dei propri finanziatori. E ciò pare sia avvenuto qui, con l'approvazione di uno zibaldone di voci di spesa le più disparate, opere di dubbia utilità, concessioni ad aziende che dovrebbero invece fallire perché fuori mercato, etc.
(Anche in Usa i politici non scherzano quanto a sfruttare la loro posizione: il successore di Obama al seggio in Senato è stato accusato di aver messo all'asta il posto liberato dal novello Presidente).
Per avere contezza visiva dei ridottissimi margini di manovra lasciati allo Stato americano, un utile grafico del rapporto Debito-Pil Usa:
Barack Obama San
DECEMBER 16, 2008
As January 20 nears, Barack Obama's ambitions for spending on the likes of roads, bridges and jobless benefits keep growing. The latest leak puts the "stimulus" at $1 trillion over a couple of years, and the political class is embracing it as a miracle cure.
Not to spoil the party, but this is not a new idea. Keynesian "pump-priming" in a recession has often been tried, and as an economic stimulus it is overrated. The money that the government spends has to come from somewhere, which means from the private economy in higher taxes or borrowing. The public works are usually less productive than the foregone private investment.
In the Age of Obama, we seem fated to re-explain these eternal lessons. So for today we thought we'd recount the history of the last major country that tried to spend its way to "stimulus" -- Japan during its "lost decade" of the 1990s. In 1992, Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa faced falling property prices and a stock market that had sunk 60% in three years. Mr. Miyazawa's Liberal Democratic Party won re-election promising that Japan would spend its way to becoming a "lifestyle superpower." The country embarked on a great Keynesian experiment:
WSJ Asia editorial page editor Mary Kissel says massive "stimulus" plans didn't help Japan. (Dec. 18)
August 1992: 10.7 trillion yen ($85 billion). Japan passed its largest-ever stimulus package to that time, with 8.6 trillion yen earmarked for public works, 1.2 trillion to expand loan quotas for small- and medium-sized businesses and 900 billion for the Japan Development Bank. The package passed in December, but investment kept falling and unemployment rose. By the end of the year, Japan's debt-to-GDP ratio was 68.6%.
April 1993: 13.2 trillion yen. At exchange rates of the day, this was a whopping $117 billion giveaway, again mostly for public works and small businesses. Tokyo erupted into domestic politicking over election practices, the economy went sideways, and the government fell. New Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa floated tax cuts, deregulation and decentralization to spur growth. But as the economy worsened -- inflation-adjusted GNP shrank 0.5% in the April to June quarter -- the political drumbeat for handouts increased.
September 1993: 6.2 trillion yen. Mr. Hosokawa announced a compromise "smaller" stimulus of $59 billion, along with minor deregulation. He dropped plans for an income-tax cut. The stimulus included 2.9 trillion yen in low-interest home financing, one trillion yen for "social infrastructure," and another trillion for business. The economy didn't respond. By the end of the year, Japan's debt-to-GDP reached 74.7%.
Is any of this beginning to sound familiar? There's more.
February 1994: 15.3 trillion yen. This stimulus included 5.8 trillion in income-tax cuts, 7.2 trillion in public investment, 1.5 trillion for small business and employment-support, 500 billion for land purchases and 230 billion for agricultural modernization. The income tax cut was temporary, effective only for 1994. The economy stagnated and Prime Minister Hosokawa resigned amid a corruption scandal. By the end of the year, debt-to-GDP was 80.2%.
September 1995: 14.2 trillion yen. The Socialist government of Tomiichi Murayama, with a wobbly coalition, rolled out a $137 billion whopper, with 4.6 trillion in public works, 3.2 trillion for government land purchases, 1.3 trillion in business loans, and more. Mr. Murayama resigned in early 1996, and in June Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto agreed to raise consumption taxes to 5% from 3%, starting in April 1997, to reduce the fiscal deficit.
In 1994 and 1995, Japan spent 3.1% and 2.9% of its annual GDP, and (helped by central bank easing) the economy did respond with modest growth for about two years. Debt-to-GDP hit 87.6%.
April 1998: 16.7 trillion yen. When growth starting slowing again, the re-elected LDP turned to old medicine: 7.7 trillion yen for public works. The $128 billion grab-bag also included 2.3 trillion for the disposal of bad loans. The government announced four trillion yen in (again) temporary income-tax cuts, spread over two years. Mr. Hashimoto resigned in July after voters registered their discontent at the polls.
November 1998: 23.9 trillion yen. Desperate to get the economy moving, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi rolled out the country's largest-ever stimulus, valued at $195 billion. The giveaway included 8.1 trillion yen in social public works, 5.9 trillion for business loans, one trillion for job-creation programs, 700 billion in cash handouts to 35 million households, and more. By the end of the year, debt-to-GDP hit 114.3%.
November 1999: 18 trillion yen. In a "last push," Mr. Obuchi's government spent 7.4 trillion yen to prop up businesses, 6.8 trillion yen for social infrastructure projects like telecommunications and environmental projects, and two trillion yen for housing loans, among other things. Debt-to-GDP reached 128.3%.
Japan's economy grow anemically over that decade, but as the nearby chart shows, its national debt exploded. Only in this decade, with a monetary reflation and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's decision to privatize state assets and force banks to acknowledge their bad debts, did the economy recover. Yet recent governments have rolled back Mr. Koizumi's reforms and returned to their spending habits. But Japan does have better roads.
Now we're told that a similar spending program -- a new New Deal -- will revive the U.S. economy. How do you say "good luck" in Japanese?
Nessun commento:
Posta un commento